WHEN JS A BANK THE BONA FIDE OWVNER OF A
CHECK LEFT FOR DEPOSIT OR COLLECTION?
The boundary of our inquiry may be more closely defined by leaving out all cases that were the subject of special agreement,- or that were so endorsed by the depositor
as to retain intentionally his ownership.2 These include a
large number and involve the application of no principle
save the most general one, that the agreement must be
founded on proper authority, or be within proper legal limitations.
At the outset, it may be stated that the courts have always maintained that the title to checks deposited by, and
credited to, a depositor who is a conteiporaneous debtor,
passes at once to the bank absolutely.3 This principle is
so strongly fortified by reason and precedent that the mere

statement of the rule will suffice.4

For the same reason,

after an advance has been made thereon, the bank becomes
either the absolute owner or a lienor for the amount of
the advance.5 The rule is equally clear that a depositor

who is credited with a check, and not as eash, retains his
'Richardson v. Louis",ille Bkg. Co., 36 C. C. A. 3o7; First National
Bank of Elkhart v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. 231 (C. C.); ManUfactureri
National Bank v. Continental Bank, 148 Mass. 553.
'Beal v. City of Somerville, i C. C. A. St8; Levi v. Bank, 5 Dill i7;
First National Batik v. Reno Co. -Bank, i McCrary 491; Sweeny v.
Easter, T Wall 166; White v. National Bank, ioa U. S. 658; Cecil Bank
v. Farmers' ljank, 22 Md. 148; Afechanics' Bank v. Valley Packing Co.,
7o Mo. 643; At illiken v. Shapleigh, 36 Mo. 598
' Titus v. Aechanics' National Batik, 35 N. J. Law 588, 592.
' Balbach v. Frelinghuysen, 15 Fed. 675, 682; Armstrong v. National
Rank of Boyertown, go Ky. 431; Taft v. Quinsigamond National Bank,
172 Mass. 363.

'Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Loyd, go N. Y. 53o; Armstrong v. Nat.
Bank of Boyertown. 9O Ky. 431, 436; Balbach %.Frelinghuysen. 15 Fed.
6y5; Scott v. Ocean Batik, 23 N. Y. 289; Giles v. Perkins,9 East 12, 14.
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ownership.' And, likewise, a depositor who is credited
with a check provisionally in anticipation of payment, but
having no right to draw against the sum credited.7
We now approach the class of cases that are the special
subject of inqui1:y-those that are deposited and credited
to the depositor with the right to draw iminediately for the
ainount of the credit. Some courts have held that the
ownership was not transferred by such action on the part
of the bank; other courts have maintained 'the 6pposite
ground. The unquestioned tendency is to hold that the
effect of such a transfer is to vest their title in the bank.
The highest court in the land recently adopted the rule,
.using the form of expression by the Court of Alipeals of
New York. which said :8 "The general doctrine that upon
a deposit made by a customer, in a bank, in the ordinary
course of business; or of money, or of drafts or checks received and credited as money, the title to the money or to
the drafts or. checks, is immediately vested in and becomes
the property of the bank, is not open to question." 9
It follows that, if the title thus passes to the bank, the
depositor's control over them ceases. Stippose a depositor
should wish to recall a check before collection on which no
advance has been made, would the bank surrender it?
Would it surrender a note that had been discounted, the.

fBailie v. Augusta Sav. Bank, 95 Ga. 277, 280; St. Louis and San
Francisco Railroad Co. V. Johnston, 23 Blatch. 492; Thompson v. Giles,
2 Barn and Cres. 422.
'AMidland Nat. Bank v. Brightuell, 148 Mo. 358; Freeholders of
County of Middlesex v. State Bank, 32 N. J.Eq. 467; Beal v. City of
Somerville, 5 U. S. App. 14; lHazlctt v. Conmmercial National Bank, 132
Pa. i18; Rapp v. National Security Bank. 136 Pa. 426; National Butchers'
and Drovers' Bank v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y. 384; Richardson v. New,
Orleans Coffee Co., 43 C. C. A. 583; First National Bank of Trinidad
v. First National Bank of Denver, 4 Dil.l. 29; Levi v. National Bank of
Missouri, 5 Dill. 1p4; Armstrong v. National Bank of Boyertown, go
Ky. 431, 437; Midland National Bank v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 35& Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131.
Burton v. United States, j96 U. S. 283, 3o2, citing Thompson v.
Riggs, y,Wall 663; Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall 252; Scammon
v. Kimball, 92 S. C. 362, 369; Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U. S. 275.
All; Aebi v. Bank of Eansrille, 124 Wis. 73; Flannery v. Coates, 80
Mo. 444; Ayers v. Farmers and Merchants' Bank, 79 Mo. 421.
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amount of which had been credited to, but"not drawn by,
the depositor, on the maker'§ request? If the title to the
checks thus passes to the bank on crediting them, then it
follows that if the bank afterward re-delivers them to the
depositor at his request, this is done as a favor, and not as
a right.'( Surely, absolute ownership by the bank is inconsistent with the right of recall by the depositor.
Clearly established as the rule is, there certainly are some
serious difficulties with the foundation on which it rests.
There is no consideration for the transfer of the title unless this be the right to draw the money represented by the
checks. This, however, is a shadowy thing, for unquestionably the bank has a right of withdrawing that credit
at any time before the depositor has used it. The depositor, therefore, receives at most a qualified right to draw
which may be defeated by the sole action of the bank. Furthernore, if the bank had not the right to withdraw its
credit, it would hardly dare make such an advance, for the
act of the bank rightly considered is a loan, or rather an
agreement to lend, for such a period of time between the
actual. deposit and collection of his checks as the depositor
may desire.
The right to cancel the credit has led some courts to
hold that a transfer was not effected by crediting; in other
words,"1 that this right was inconsistent with absolute
ownership; but more frequently the courts have held other-

wise.12 In a well reasoned case decided by the Supreme
Court of Kansas, it was said: "It may be conceded that
if, after due and legal effort to collect a check, it should
be dishonored, the bank would have the right to charge
the amount of it to the depositor's account. Whether this
" Metropolitan A'alional Bank v. Loyd. 9 N. Y. 530, 535.
"National 1utrhers' and Druvers' Bank Y. Hubbell, 117 N. Y. 384,
393 394.

' A ,res v. Farmers' & Aferchants' Bank, 79 Mn. 42T; Flannery v.
C,,tes' o Mo. 444; First Nat. Rank of Elkhart v. Arinslrang. 39 Fed.
(C. C.') 231, 233: Riverside Bank v. JVoodhaven Junction Land Co., 34
N. Y. App. Div. 3;9.
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right may be said to rest merely on the custom of banks,
or whether the custom has been crystallized into a rule,
and the right now may be said to be an implied condition
attaching to the transfer of the paper, makes no difference.
It is, nevertheless, in strictness, the right of an endorsee
against an endorser, and hence is not, in any sense, inconsistent with ownership."Is
On three grounds, then, the right of ownership may be
maintained with the right of charging a check back if it
is not paid. First, the right is not absolute in a technical
sense. Though ihat word has been occasionally used by
the courts ifthat connection, yet it has been used inadvertently, since absolute ownership and the right of charging
back are manifestly inconsistent. The courts have doubtless meant essential or conditional ownership, since the occasio-i for charging checks back rarely occurs, considering
the vast use of checks in modern society. Second, if a
check could not be charged back, a dkpositor would ordinarily save nothing since he would be liable on his endorsement. This is a liability independent of the trinsfer by
the depositor of ownership to the bank. But as the legal
enforcement of this right by suit may be prevented by permititing the collecting bank to charge the check back; this
can be done.' 4 Third, as the seller of personal property
impliedly warrants the title, the purchaser is no less an absolute owner because he has redress against the seller
should his title fail.
But if the title is absolutely transferred to the bank by
crediting with the right to draw, in the technical sense in
"Noble v. Dou.qhten. 72 Kan. 336,345.
"InMetropolitan Nat. Bank v. Loyd, 25 Hun. ior, To6, Daniels, J.,
said: ."As this chieck was tran-iferred to and received by the bank it
became its property, and the fact that it had the right in case of nonpayment, upon prescntment, to charge the amount of it back in the
account of the customer, did not change the nature of the transaction
through which it was received, for that right resulted, not from any
agreement existing between the parties upom the subject, but from the
rights which. the bank might derive fron proceedings afterwards tiken
to charge the dvjositor as the endorser."
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which the term "absolute" is used, then the right to charge
the check back if the collecting bank fails withoit any negligence on its part to complete the collection, clearly does
not exist. This is a logical rule and has been upheld by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts. Nevertheless, a bank
has a remedy on the depositor's endorsement, for this is an
independent liability. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court of the United States has declared that "the mere
credit of a check upon the books of a bank, which may be
cancelled at any time, does not make the bank a bona fide
u
This may be easily reconciled with
purchaser for value.""
the rule in the Burton case by also holding that technically
when the ownership of a check passes, it cannot be charged
back. Yet doubtless that court would hold, as the courts
in New York, Kansas and other States have held, that as
the depositor is liable on his independent contract of endorsement, the easier way of adjusting the difficulty is to
permit the collecting bank to charge back the uncollected
check.
By such an interpretation of the decisions, they can be
harmonized with the rule that prevails when a note is discounted for a borrower who is credited with the amount.
On such occasions, it has been decided that a bank is hot
a Imna fide holder until it has paid the money. Let us begin our review with Daniel: "The apparent purchase must
have been a purchase in fact and not a mere bookkeeping
entry. Mere discount and credit do not of themselves constitute a bona fide purchase for value. To occupy that position, the holder must actually have parted with something
of value for the note." 1 7 In the American and English Encyclopedia of Law,1 8 it is said: "Where a bank discounts
paper for a depositor who is not in its debt and gives him
credit upon its books for the proceeds of such paper, it is
not a bona fide holder for value, so as to be protected
"Taft v. Quinsigamnond Vat. Bank, 172 Mass. 363, 366.
Neg. Inst. Sec. 779 b. 5th Edition.
"VoL 4, 2d Edition.
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against infirmities in the paper, unless, in addition to the
mere fact of crediting the depositor with the proceeds of
the paper, some other and valuable consideration passes.
Such a transaction simply creates the relation of debtor and
creditor between the bank and the depositor."
Passing from these statements of text writers to original sources, ample confirnation is found. In Central National Bank v. Valentine, 9 the Court said: "The plaintiff
by its president discounted the notes and gave the makers
credit on the books of the bank for the a'mount, no money
was actually paid or thing of value parted with by the plaintiff upon the strength of the endorsement or the discount.
Under such circumstances, the plaintiff cannot be regarded
the bona fide holder of said notes for value. * * * The mere
giving of credit by entering the amount on the books and
not actually parting with a dollar upon the strength of the
endorsement, cannot be regarded parting with value in the
sene in which the law contemplates. The parties in whose
favor the credit was given might never draw or appropriate
any portion of the fund."
Fifteen years afterward, the same court said in a case of
similar character: "The bank could not become a holder
for value of the note by crediting its amount -to the cashier. Unless he received the money as an individual, and not
as cashier, the bank parted with nothing as a consideration
for the note.""-(' And in a still later case, the same court
declared concerning a note which had been discounted for
the payee who had been credited with the proceeds on the
books of the bank: "The plaintiff must have actually paid
out and parted with the proceeds of the discount before it
One more
could acquire an indisputable title thereto." 2'
citation may be given from the court in the same State; the
Appellate Division decided three years ago: "A bank is
j8 Hun. 417.

l)ykmnan v. Northbridge,8o Hun. 258.
' Sixth National Uaznk v. Lorillhrd Brick Works Co., 46 N. Y. St.
Rochester 235.
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not a holder of a note in due course as defined by the Negotiable Instrumnents Law (which in this regard, follows the
common law), when the proceeds of the nPte are22simply
creditc( to the person from whom it was purchased..
It may be further noted that the tribunals of the State
which maintain the rule concerning the bona fide ownership of a note that is discounted by a bank which credits
the proceeds to the borrower, are the same tribunals which

first clearly established the rule concerning the ownership
of checks credited to depositors with the right to -diaw
immediately against the amount credited. This was done
in Mctfopolitan National Bank v. Loyd, by the Supreme
Court of New York, whose decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and has been often cited to sustain later
decisions. Said the Supreme Court in that case: "By the acceptance of tl'e check by the bank receiving it as so much
money, it became the debtor to the customer to the extent
of the amount credited on account of it. And while he did
not draw checks or drafts against it, but the bank was
largely his debtor, he still had the right to do it if he had
been so disposed. The account, including the amount of
the check, stood with his assent as so much money subject
to his disposal, and because of that circumstance, he ceased
to be the owner of the. check, and the title to it became
vested in the bank or its own property and subject to its
risk in' case of loss." 23 This principle has been often affirmed both by the courts of New York and by those of
other States.
Otlher States have maintained the same rule concerning
notes discounted for, and credited to, the account of depositors. One of the latest deliverances is by the Supreme
Court of Iowa, in which the court says: "If a bank discounts paper for one of its depositors, giving him credit
"Albany Co. Bank v. People's Ice Co., 92 App. Div. 47, 55; Clarke
National Bank v. Bank of Albion, 5- Barb. 592; Nat. Bank of Barre v.
Foley. io3 N. Y. Supp. ;j3.
'Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Loyd, 25 Hun, 1o, xo, affd. go N.Y. &1m
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therefor upon its books for the proceeds, it is not a bona
fide holder unless some other and valuable consideration
passes. 2 4 The Courts of Michigan,2 Wisconsin,2" Kansas,2 " have announced the same rule.
In a recent New York case, there is idisposition to bring
the check rule into more perfect harmony with that
which applies to notes discounted for, and credited to, depositors. After setting forth the four elements needful to
constitute a bona fide purchaser by the Negotiable Instruments Law, and that one of these is that the Instrument
must have been taken in good faith and for value, the Court
says: "The authorities hold that the mere crediting to a
depositor's account, on the books of a bank, of the amount
of a check drawn upon another bank, where the depositor's
account continues to be sufficient to pay the check in case
it is dishonored, does not constitute the bank a holder in
28
due course."1
This clearly marks a departure from the rule in the Loyd
Case, and rests on a different foundation. The change of
ownership of the check in the Loyd Casc rested On the
crediting of it as cash with the immediate right to draw for
the amount, without the slightest regard to the condition of
the depositor's account. In the Cowles Case, such a crediting with the right to draw (lid not change the ownership
of the check, if the depcsitor's balance was adequate to pay
the amount of the check thus credited, had it been drawn
out regardless of the credit thus given.
Does not this rule rest on a more rational foundation?
Indeed, is there any Valid reason for applying a different
rule to checks that are credited to their depositors- as cash
than is applied to notes that are discounted for and credited
to depositors? The transactions are similar in every essen113

'

City Deposit Bank v. Green, 130 Iowa 384; McKnight v. Parow,
W. 858.
N.
Drovers' Nat. Bank v. Blue, uxo Mich.; 67 N. W. zioS.

IManufacturer Nat. Bank v. Newhall, 71 Wis. 309.
"Mann v. Second Nat. Bank, 30 Kans. 412.
Citizens' State Bank v. Cowles, x8o N. Y. .346,revg. 89 Ap. 28.
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tial respect. In both, the. depositor has a right to draw
when he pleases; in both, the debtor and creditor relation
exists between him and the bank with respect to the deposit.
In the one case, the bank owns or holds the depositor's
note; in the other, his check. Its right and control over
the one instrument is as perfect as its control over the other.
The note can be given up before the money is drawn if the
depositor should become insolvent, or, if it was forged, or
t.ossesses other infirmity not kiown when it was received,
andthe credit can be cancelled. A check can be returned if
it was forged or otherwise imperfect, and should prove to
be "uncoliectable after using the legally required diligence.
May not the decision in the Cowles case be regarded as a
return to a more rational view concerning the ownership of
a check credited to a depositor with the right to immediate
payment? In other words, so long as .adepositor checks
against his actual cash deposit, he is not borrowing, and the
bank is not the bona fide purchaser of checks credited to
him, but not collected. When his checks go beyond this
line, then the bank becomes the owner either .absolutely,
or to the extent of its lien.
Albert S. Bolles.

